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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, crime and violence in the United States have
evolved into a serious epidemic affecting every American. 1 Fear and outrage
have captured the American mood, and the citizenry has begun to demand swift
and effective action from its elected officials to contain this abhorrent behavior
and return the streets to law-abiding citizens. While everybody seems to agree
that the present situation needs rectification, determining the proper approach
has been the subject of endless debate and discussion. The issue of gun control
as a method of reducing the ever present violence in our society is perhaps one
of the most hotly debated subjects in crime prevention.2
*This Note received the 1995 Donald S. Teller Memorial Award as the second year
writing that contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal.
I H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984, 1985 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 18; U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 292-371; Wendy Max
& Dorothy Rice, Shooting in the Dark- Esimating the Cost of Fireann Injuries, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Winter 1992)).
2 Due to its complexity and sensitivity, the issue of gun control as an effective method
of crime prevention is beyond the scope of this Note. Numerous sources are available for
exploration into the gun control debate. See generally Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The
Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. L.J 589 (1991) (arguing that in
attempting to defend "assault weapon" bans on the grounds that such weapons have no
gaming purpose, such advocates miss the point for which the Second Amendment was
passed-to protect citizens from an oppressive government); Mark Udulutch, The
Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic Gun Control Proposals, 17
AM. J. CRiM. L. 19 (1989) (pushing several gun control proposals for adoption); Sanford
Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1991)
(emphasizing the need for legal academics to take the Second Amendment more seriously
when constructing their "maps" of constitutional structure); Robert A. O'Hare, Jr. & Jorge
Pedreira, Note, An Uncertain Right. The Second Amendment and the Assault Weapon
Legislat'on Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 179 (1992) (arguing that much of the
constitutional debate surrounding gun control measures only serves to mask political ulterior
motives); Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second
Amendment: To What F-ent Is There an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 37
VILL. L. REv. 1407 (1992) (exploring the historical antecedents to the Second Amendment
to argue that the Second Amendment was intended to protect an individual's right to keep
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Government interference with a citizen's right to operate, possess or own a
firearm sharply divides the electorate, and as a result, a political showdown has
resulted with both sides armed with an arsenal of legal and constitutional
arguments. In an attempt to respond to the ever-increasing cries of help from
the communities victimized and held hostage by the onslaught of crime and
violence, the United States Congress waded through the morass of debate and
conflict and enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act3 (Brady Act),
as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 19684 (Gun Control Act).
This Note will explore recent challenges to the constitutionality of the
Brady Act through an analysis of the present Supreme Court interpretation of
the Tenth Amendment and an exploration of the recent decisions evaluating the
challenges raised by local law enforcement officials and the National Rifle
Association. Part II of this Note will set forth a brief history and explanation of
the Brady Act, as well as the law enforcement official's required duties under
the legislation. Additionally, Part II will explore the points of contention
between the federal government and law enforcement officials. In Part MII, this
Note will examine the evolution of the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment
analysis, and will present and explore the Court's recent interpretation in New
York v. United States.5 Part IV will examine the validity of the Brady Act in
light of present Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and modem statutory
construction.
II. TEE BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT
A. The Brady Act
On November 30, 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Act6 in an effort to
and bear arms).
3 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V
1993)).
4 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928
(1988 & Supp. 11989, Supp. Il 1990, Supp. 1111991, Supp. IV 1992, Supp. V 1993)).
5 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
6 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1993). "[The Act was created] to provide for a waiting
period before the purchase of the handgun, and for the establishment of a national instant
criminal background check system to be contacted by firearms dealers before the transfer of
any firearm." Id.
The purpose of [the Brady Act] is to prevent convicted felons and other persons
who are barred by law from purchasing guns from licensed gun dealers, manufacturers
or importers.... Local law enforcement officials are required to use the waiting period
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thwart the escalating problems associated with handguns in America. As an
amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, 7 the legislation imposed new and
controversial procedures and requirements in the area of gun control. As the
federal government's first attempt at controlling the firearms market, the Gun
Control Act implemented a federal regulatory program which empowered the
government to police the manufacture, distribution, and sale of firearms and
handguns to the general public.8 Most importantly, the Gun Control Act
established a federal licensing procedure for firearms dealers. 9 Under the Act,
in order to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing or dealing in
firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition, an individual must file an
application with the Secretary of the Treasury who will issue a license upon
determination of eligibility.10
Perhaps the most important element of this portion of the legislation was
the maintenance of records and files on the transfers and sales of firearms. 11
Under 18 U.S.C. § 923(g), the recipients of the federal firearms dealer license
must maintain records, and the dealer must allow the Secretary of the Treasury
to inspect the records upon proper authorization. However, prior to the
enactment of the Brady Act, the control of weapon sales to felons, fugitives and
other individuals lacking the requisite responsibility necessary for gun
ownership rested entirely upon the knowledge and good faith of the federally
licensed firearms dealer. The Gun Control Act made it unlawful for any
individual to sell or transfer a firearm to any person they knew or had
reasonable cause to believe did not meet the specified criteria Congress
considered prerequisite to the ownership of a firearm. 12 Without the
to determine whether a prospective handgun purchaser has a felony conviction or is
otherwise prohibited by law from buying a gun.
H.R. REP. No. 344, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1984 (emphasis
added).
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1988 & Supp. 11989, Supp. 11 1990, Supp. 1111991, Supp.
IV 1992, Supp. V 1993).
8 Id.
9 18 U.S.C. § 923 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989, Supp. H1 1990, Supp. 1111991, Supp. IV
1992, Supp. V 1993).
10 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (Supp. IV 1965-1968).
11 This requirement of record keeping is evident in both 18 U.S.C. § 923(c) (Supp. IV
1965-1968) and 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (Supp. IV 1965-1968).
12 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1)-(4) (Supp. IV 1965-1968). This section states:
It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed
dealer, or licensed collector to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition
to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person-
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requirement of a waiting period and background check, the Gun Control Act,
instead, relied upon self-certification whereby a prospective gun purchaser
would sign a sworn statement attesting to their capacity to purchase a
firearm. 13 As a result, prior to the passage of the Brady Act, self-certification
provided the only means of policing the firearms market in America. In
response to increasing pressure from the public, Congress implemented the
Brady Act in an effort to quell the fears of its electorate.
The Brady Act requires a waiting period of five business days for
purchases of handguns from federally licensed gun dealers. 14 Intended solely as
an interim provision until the federal government could implement an instant
national background check system, the Act requires the local police officers to
do the check for a limited time.15 The background check provision augments
the prior scheme by requiring the federally licensed firearms dealer to have the
prospective gun purchaser complete a new information form.' 6 The new form
requires that the prospective recipient of the firearm provide a statement of
biographical information and a sworn statement that he or she is not prohibited
by law from receiving the weapon.17 Upon receipt of the application from a
prospective customer, the firearms dealer must, in certain cases, 18 transmit the
(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) is a fugitive from justice;
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant
drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or
narcotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any
mental institution.
Id.
13 Federal firearms dealers were required to have potential gun purchasers complete
ATF Form 4473, on which the customer would certify whether he or she was permitted to
receive or possess a firearm. Commerce in Firearms and Ammunition, 33 Fed. Reg.
18555, 18569-70 (1968) (codified at 27 C.F.R. § 178.124 (1995)).
14 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 1993).
15 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1993). The Brady Act requires that the Attorney
General establish a national instant background check system no later than 60 months after
the enactment of the legislation. As a result, the burden of a 5 day waiting period and
background check was intended to be only temporary. Id.
16 Prospective purchasers are to fill out an ATF Form 5300.35 in order to facilitate the
background checks. 27 C.F.R. § 178.102 (1995).
17 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3)(A)-(B)Ci)-(iv) (Supp. V 1993).
18 No background check or waiting period is required in certain circumstances. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(B)-(F) (Supp. V 1993). The waiting period may be avoided if the
transferee demostrates in a written statement they need a hangun because of life threatening
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information and send a copy of the form to the Chief Law Enforcement Officer
(CLEO) assigned to the place of residence of the applicant within one day of its
receipt.19
The Brady Act places the background check responsibilities onto CLEOs
in every locality. Under the Brady Act, a CLEO is defined as "the chief of
police, the sheriff or an equivalent officer or the designee of any such
individual." 20 The rationale for requiring local law enforcement officials to
conduct the background checks is best expressed by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms in an Open Letter to State and Local Law Enforcement
Officials:
Each law enforcement agency serving as the CLEO will have to set it (sic) own
standards based on its own circumstances, i.e., the availability of resources,
access to records, and taking into account the law enforcement priorities of the
jurisdiction. The law is designed so that the law enforcement authority who is
doing the check, is the one who is most likely to have to deal with the
consequences of the buyer obtaining a handgun. Therefore, the CLEO of the
buyer's residence has a vested interest in conducting an appropriate check and
ultimately is in the best position to determine what is reasonable.
In rural, sparsely populated counties where many handgun purchasers are
personally known to the CLEO, little or no research may be necessary in many
cases.
2 1
circumstances, id. § 922(s)(1)(B); transferee presents a permit which entitles the transferee
to possess the gun, id. § 922(s)(1)(C); if an authorized government official determines
possession of the firearm by the transferee would not violate the law, id. § 922(s)(1)(D); the
Secretary approves the transfer, id. § 922(s)(1)(E); and transmission of the transferee's
statement is impracticable, id. § 922(s)(1)(F).
19 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(m)-(iV) (Supp. V 1993). Under the Brady Act, the
firearms dealer is subject to other requirements as well. The dealer must verify the
purchaser's identity, id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I1); the dealer must inform the CLEO of the place
of business of the dealer, the place of residence of the purchaser and any information the
dealer receives after the purchaser has purchased the handgun that receipt or posssession of
the handgun by the purchaser violates federal, state, or local law within one business day
after receipt of such information, id. § 922(s)(4); the dealer is forbidden from disclosing the
information to the public, id. § 922(s)(5); and the dealer must maintain copies of the
statement and other requisite paperwork pertaining to the sale of the firearm, id. §
922(s)(6)(A).
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8) (Supp. V 1993).
21 Open Letter from the ATF (Ian. 21, 1994), quoted in Koog v. United States, 852 F.
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Relying upon the local law enforcement officials' knowledge of the
community in which they reside and work, the Congress and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms hope to reduce the impact the background
check will have on the law enforcement process. Additionally, by placing the
responsibility onto the local official, the Brady Act creates a "vested interest"
whereby the consequences of a dangerous individual obtaining a handgun
provide the necessary impetus for local law enforcement involvement in the
handgun purchase process.
The duties of the CLEO under the Brady Act involve an investigation into
the background of the potential purchaser. After receiving the information from
the firearms dealer, the CLEO
to whom a transferor has provided notice... shall make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession would be in
violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local
recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the
Attorney General. 22
The Brady Act prohibits the firearms dealer from selling or transferring the
weapon to the prospective purchaser until either the CLEO notifies the dealer
that the CLEO does not have any information prohibiting the transfer or after
five business days have elapsed from the date the dealer furnished the notice to
the CLEO, whichever occurs first.23 The CLEO's obligations under the Brady
Act do not terminate simply with the completion of the background check. If
the CLEO determines that the purchaser can lawfully obtain the weapon from
the firearms dealer, the officer shall, within twenty business days after the date
the prospective buyer made the statement, destroy the statement and any record
generated from the information derived from the statement. 24 However, if the
CLEO determines that the purchaser is ineligible to receive the firearm after the
requisite investigation, the individual prohibited from receiving the firearm may
request that the officer provide the reason for such a determination.25
Additionally, in order to insure compliance with its newly enacted laws,
Congress had the Brady Act amend the Gun Control Act's penalty provisions2 6
to make violators of § 922(s) subject to penalties of no more than one thousand
Supp. 1376, 1379 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
22 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
23 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)l-(ll) (Supp. V 1993).
24 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B)Ci) (Supp. V 1993).
25 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C) (Supp. V 1993). The CLEO must provide the reasons for
such determination in writing within 20 business days after receipt of the request. Id.
26 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (Supp. IV 1965-1968).
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dollars, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.27
B. The Act as a Violation of the Tenth Amennent
Recently, local law enforcement officials and the National Rifle Association
have argued that the Brady Act is an improper infringement on state
sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 28 In six separate cases,29
local sheriffs and law enforcement officials brought suit against the federal
government arguing that the Brady Act violated the Tenth Amendment. Each
plaintiff's basic argument rested upon the theory that the compulsory nature of
the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment because it "commandeers" 30 state
and local actors to administer a federally prescribed act.3 1 Basic to the
argument is the controversy surrounding the implementation of unfunded
federal mandates onto state and local governments, for it is here where the
major point of contention lies within the Tenth Amendment analysis.3 2 In
short, state and local officials quite often resent the federal government
meddling into the affairs of the state and local governments, and the resentment
27 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993) ("Whoever knowingly violates subsection (s)
or (t) of section 922 shall be fined not more than $1000, imprisoned for not more than 1
year, or both.").
28 U.S. CoNsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
29 Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. La. 1995); Frank v. United
States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D.
Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United
States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503
(D. Mont. 1994).
30 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
31 David Broder, To Some, The Brady Bill Is Just Another Unfunded Mandate, CHIc.
TRm., June 1, 1994, at 21.
3 2 While a full discussion of the impact of federal mandates is beyond the scope of this
Note, there are some very interesting writings on the subject available. See generally Paul
Gillmor & Fred Eames, Reconstruction of Federalisn: A Constitut'onal Amendment to
Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1994) (decrying the use of
unfunded mandates as being repugnant to federalism and advocating the passge of a
constitutional amendment to reign in Congress' tendency to employ unfunded mandates);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendnent: On
Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1993)
(employing a public choice model to conclude that unfunded mandates are the result of
politicians who take advantage of the structure of government to provide largesse to
minority constituencies).
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is most powerful when the federal government directs how the state and local
officials should allocate their tax revenue.33
Ill. THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Evolution of the Tenth Amendment
When the founding fathers drafted the Tenth Amendment, fears of an
overpowering central government were fresh in their minds, for they had just
escaped from an oppressive, authoritarian government through a fierce and
violent struggle.34 Instead of placing unlimited powers into the hands of the
federal government, they specifically enumerated in the Constitution, "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
33 Unfunded federal mandates have been thrust into the public's eye as a result of the
November 1994 election. With ever-increasing budget demands on both state and local
governments, these mandates have caused some to argue that the policy behind such
mandates needs to be seriously examined. See Mickey Edwards, Getting the Big Boys Off
Our Backs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994, at B15; George F. Will, Tenth Amendment 7Yme,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1995, at 68. Although a discussion of these mandates moves way
beyond the intentions of this Note, Congress has recently passed legislation addressing the
unfunded mandate situation. The House of Representatives passed the Unfunded Mandate
Reform Act of 1995 on February 1, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. H1011-1012 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1995). The Act passed in the Senate on January 27, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. S1683 (daily
ed. Jan. 27, 1995). The House has also considered other pieces of legislation addressing the
problem of unfunded mandates: The Unfunded Federal Mandates Relief Act of 1995, 141
CONG. REc. H171 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1995), and a proposal to amend the Constitution of the
United States barring federal unfunded mandates to the states, 141 CONG. REC. H175 (daily
ed. Jan. 9, 1995).
34 See generally ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CoNsTrrrroN, ITS ORIGnNS AND DEvELOPMENT 50-54 (4th ed. 1970) (providing examples
of the British government's overpowering administration of the colonies). Although the
founding fathers created a decentralized state-oriented system to avoid the accompanying
problems of a strong central government, the breadth of federal powers was subject to
debate and controversy during the formation of the Constitution. See generally MORTEN
BORDEN, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS (1965) (providing excerpts from papers, letters, etc.,
of those who opposed ratification of the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander
Hamilton) (arguing that a stronger and more united central government is in the best
interests both politically and economically of each of the individual states); THE FEDERALIST
No. 45 (James Madison) (surmising that since the States are essential to the functioning of
the federal government and the federal government is not essential to the continuation of the
states, states will be in an advantageous position under the Constitution); CEcELiA M.
KENYON, THE ANTiFEDERALISTS (1966) (noting that the Antifederalists were composed
largely of "men of little faith" in centralized government).
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by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." 35
While the intentions of the founding fathers may seem apparent, the Tenth
Amendment, through interpretation, oversight, or simple ignorance, appears to
have become the forgotten amendment of the Bill of Rights.3 6
Over the years, the Supreme Court has traveled an unusual path in its
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. In the beginning, the Court held that
the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause37 should be given
great deference, thus allowing the federal government to trump certain state
rights and functions. 38 As time passed, however, the court retracted some
degree of the power that they had read into the Commerce Clause and limited
congressional intrusions into the realm of power reserved to the states.39
However, toward the end of the New Deal era, the Court once again
changed direction and held that the federal government deserved deference.40
Through the Court's renewal of the broader, more generous interpretation, the
breadth of federal power continued to expand over the next few decades with
the Tenth Amendment no longer viewed as an obstruction to the powers of the
federal government. Thus, subsequent to the New Deal era, Congress enjoyed
35 U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
3 6 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 33; William Murchison, The Forgotten Amendment,
TEx. LAw., Aug. 15, 1994, at 22; Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Pleading the 10th... and
Winning!, WASH. TIMES, June 12, 1994, at B3.
37 U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-97 (1824).
39 As the Court began to establish a line to distinguish the powers of the Congress and
the powers that were reserved to the state governments, it set forth a concept of "dual
federalism." See generally Edward Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1950) (noting that with the passing of federalism what was a Constitution of Rights
has instead become a Constitution of Powers). The Court intepreted the Tenth Amendment
to define and limit the powers of the Congress and determine which activities and
regulations were reserved to the states. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 4.5, at 143 (1991). Prior to the New Deal era, the Court repeatedly
struck down federal legislation that imposed on state power and sovereignty. See, e.g.,
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); United States
v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The New Deal and the Great Depression saw the
Court maintain its strict control over the scope of federal legislation through a broad Tenth
Amendment interpretation protecting state sovereignty. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), overnded by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
40 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1937).
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broad discretion in regulating the states under the Commerce Clause.41
Nonetheless, in 1976, the Supreme Court rehabilitated the Tenth
Amendment and the powers reserved to the states. In National League of Cities
v. Usery,42 the Court ruled that the Fair Labor Standards Act could not be
applied to regulate the minimum wage and overtime compensation of state and
municipal employees. 43 The Court held that the Tenth Amendment expressly
declares that the Congress may not exercise its power in a manner that
infringes on the powers solely reserved to the states.44 However, the Court did
explicitly note that the Tenth Amendment would not limit federal regulation of
the activities of nongovernmental employees and entities, as the Court had no
intentions of disturbing the modem tests for determining the breadth of the
federal commerce power.45 The Court was concerned with congressional
intrusion into the traditional functions of the states, and it found that
determining the level of compensation to state employees was an essential
attribute belonging to the state.46
During the period from 1976 until 1985, the Court did not strike down any
federal actions under the National League of Cities interpretation; however, the
lower courts had tremendous difficulty with the chore of identifying the powers
and activities solely reserved to the states. As a result, the lower courts
produced an abundance of inconsistent decisions regarding the Tenth
Amendment.47 After the National League of Cities decision, the Court
attempted to structure formal tests to enable a precise determination of the
applicability of the Tenth Amendment in regards to federal law interfering with
state and local autonomy. 48 Although the Court had made numerous efforts to
41 For an excellent discussion of the post-New Deal decisions see 1 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CoNsTrrurIoNAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4.8-
4.9 (1986).
42 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruling Marland v. Writz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
43 National League of Cties, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
44 Id. at 845. The majority stated: "Congress may not.., force directly upon the
States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made." Id. at 855.
45 Id. at 841.
46 Id. at 845.
47 NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 39, § 4.10, at 171.
48 See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239-40 (1983) (permitting the state to set its
own goals as long as it applied the federal regulations in the process); Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753-58 (1982) (ignoring the test and
instead relying upon the extensive powers of the Commerce Clause); United Transp. Union
v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 683-86 (1982) (holding that the state-owned railroad
was not performing a "traditional governmental function," and therefore, the state was not
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fashion a Tenth Amendment analysis under the National League of Cities
decision, the Court's attempts proved unsuccessful. 4
9
As a result, the Court revisited the issue of the Tenth Amendment in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Association.50 The Garcia
Court reverted back to the expansive interpretation of the federal powers that
had existed for over forty years before the decision in National League of
Cities.51 In overruling National League of Cities,52 the Court said that the
political process was the proper restraint on the powers of the federal
government; 53 therefore, the judiciary should refrain from interfering with
federal and state policies. 54 The Court abandoned the confusing traditional
government function tests of National League of Cities55 and rejected judicially
enforced federalism that preserved a state's "traditional governmental
functions" from federal regulatory interference. 56
The Court's reliance upon the political process shifted the Court's analysis
of the Tenth Amendment from a judicial doctrine into a political doctrine,57
entitled to immunity); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (articulating the three-prong National League of Cities test).
49 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
5 0 i at 530; see Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority: The Demise ofa Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REV. 84, 85 (1985).
51 In reverting back to its earlier position, the Garcia Court reaffirmed the deference
that had been given to the Congress during the period between the decisions in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
5 3 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
54 One commentator has argued that the judicial involvement that arose from the
National League of Cities decision was quite similar to the Lochner period of judicial
activism in which the Court conducted its affairs in the nature of a superlegislature. Field,
supra note 50, at 89-95.
55 426 U.S. at 852.
56 Note, Cear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1961 (1994).
57 Robert H. Freilich & David G. Richardson, Returning to a General Theory of
Federalism: Framing a New Tenth Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 26 URn.
LAW. 215, 219 (1994). Originally Professor Wechsler argued that the states' role in the
operation of the federal government through the election of Senators, Representatives in the
House and the President, would exert pressure and influence into the political process that
would ensure that the states' needs and powers are protected. Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 543, 546 (1954). Some commentators
question the ability of the political process to protect state rights. Some argue that this
theory runs into problems because in recent years the important vehicles of state influence
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leaving the states with the procedural safeguards of the federal system as their
primary defense58 against federal interference in the internal affairs of the
states. 59 The Court continued its march away from federalism when it
reaffirmed the Garcia holding three years later in South Carolina v. Baker.60
Although the Court had made significant strides away from its federalism
jurisprudence, the federalism debate was once again revived in Gregory v.
Ashcroft. 61 While focusing on the validity of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196762 as applied to state judges, the Court stated that the
principles of federalism and dual sovereignty rejected the presumption of the
Act's validity in regard to state officials without clear and unambiguous
language to the contrary. 63 Although the case set forth the ground work for the
resurgence of federalism, the Court made no significant changes to the doctrine
established in Garcia.64 Yet, Gregory set the stage for the Court's revision of
the Tenth Amendment standards in New York v. United States,65 which the
Court tackled in the following term.
(namely Senators, political parties and the news media) have become much more connected
with the nation as a whole than as direct representatives of the states. However, others
contend that the Garcia decision reaffirms the strength of the political process because,
without interference of the judicial branch, individuals can voice their opinions into the
public forum and Congress can respond to the views of its citizenry. Note, At Last, Federal
Wage and Overtime Protection for State and Municipal Empoyees [sic]: 7he F.L.S.A. After
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 23 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 115-18
(1986).
58 The Garcia Court postulated that federal interference with state activities may be
invalid if the state alleges and proves some "extraordinary defects in the national political
process." South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)).
5 9 Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1419, 1425 (1994).
60 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988). In the previous term, the Court continued to shift away
from federalism when it decided that the Congress could withhold the payment of highway
funds if a state refused to comply with its mandatory drinking age requirements. South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1987).
61 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
62 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988 & Supp. 1 1989, Supp. 1I 1990, Supp. IMI 1991, Supp. IV 1992)).
63 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 904 (1994).64 Jesse H. Choper, Federalism and Judicial Review: An Update, 21 HASTINGS CoNsT.
L.Q. 577, 582-83 (1994).
65 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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B. New York v. United States
In New York,6 the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,67 under which states were
obligated to dispose of the wastes generated within their borders. 68 In order to
assure compliance with its directives, the Congress established three types of
incentives for states: monetary incentives, 69 access incentives, 70 and take title
incentives. 71 The Supreme Court held that the monetary incentives and access
incentives were well within the powers of Congress under the Spending and
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.72
However, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found the take title
provision of the Act to be objectionable because it commanded the states to
comply with the federally prescribed waste disposal methods or take title to the
waste.73 The Court reasoned that if the federal government could compel the
66 For some helpful analyses of the present state of federalism and the New York
decision, see generally Freilich & Richardson, supra note 57 (providing advice on how state
governments can restore federalism by using the judicial inroads created in the New York
decision); David M. O'Brien, The Supreme Court and Intergovernmental Relations: What
Happened to "Our Federalism"?, 9 I.L. & PoL'Y 609 (1993) (noting that the Rehnquist
Court in its attempt to restore "dual Federalism" has yet to resolve the inherent line-drawing
problems associated with dual federalism); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 63 (arguing that
federalism arose in the U.S. more as a convenient remanent of British colonial
administration than as an adoption by the founding fathers of a political theory).67 Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988)).
68 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (1988).
69 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) allows the states with the waste disposal sites to collect a
surcharge on waste imported from other states. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2020e(d)(2)(A), the
Secretary of Energy makes payments from these funds to each state that has complied with
the Act.
70 Congress established penalties in the form of additional surcharges to states that did
not comply within the proper deadlines stated by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2)(A)
(1988).
71 The take title provision was the most severe in that it forced the state, upon request
of the generator, to accept full ownership and responsibility of the waste if the state did not
provide disposal facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988).
72 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1992). Since each set of
incentives was supported by affirmative constitutional grants of power to the Congress,
neither of the incentives intruded onto state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.
Id.
73 Id. at 175-76. "As an initial matter, Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.'" Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
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state and local governments to do its dirty work and choose the methods and
locations for waste disposal, the accountability of the federal officials will be
diminished. 74 Instead, the state officials will bear the brunt of the public
disapproval, even though they lack the ability to avoid implementation of the
program. 75 Recognizing the inequity of the arrangement, the Court stated that
"[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate,
it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents." 76
The essential thrust of the Tenth Amendment is to preserve the sovereignty of
the states and prevent an overbearing federal government from dictating local
policies and plans from afar.77
As a result of the overreaching intrusions of the Congress into the area of
state sovereignty, the Court permitted New York State to dictate its own
policies concerning the disposal of radioactive waste.78 According to the New
York Court, Congress may encourage state regulation rather than compel it
through the offering of incentives, or Congress may simply preempt the state
government and regulate the area itself. 79
Once again, the Court has entered into the realm of federalism, and the
future of this area of constitutional jurisprudence is unclear. 80 With its recent
foray into this field, the Court has again diffused the guiding light of its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. As a result, the lower courts have had to sift
through the recent decisions and attempt to fashion logical and well-reasoned
74 New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 178.
77 Justice O'Connor concluded the opinion by stating:
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The
positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most
detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty," reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth
Amendment.
Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.
Id. at 188 (citing THE FEDERALST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 166-69.
80 William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Resticzon on
Congressional Power vis-d-vis the States?, 55 OHio ST. L.J 237, 253 (1994).
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opinions regarding the Tenth Amendment's application without clear direction
from the Supreme Court.81
IV. TAKING AIM AT THE BRADY ACT
Recently, six separate actions 82 were filed challenging the constitutionality
of the Brady Act.83 The facts of each controversy are quite similar. In these
cases, six rural sheriffs sought to overturn or enjoin the Brady Acts provisions
which impose onto CLEOs requirements of a background check on any
handgun purchased by residents of their jurisdiction. Each case more or less
81 The district court in Koog v. United States accurately expressed the problems with
the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court stating that: "Supreme Court
decisions about the Tenth Amendment do not reflect a pattern of straight line development
of a theme. . . . Mhis Court has no better guide than simply to align the principles
enunciated in these cases on a continuum and decide where the instant case falls." 852 F.
Supp. 1376, 1381 (W.D. Tex. 1994). The court concluded "[o]pinions such as New York,
Garda, and FERC all exist side by side as precedents binding on [the] Court." Id. at 1387.
Since New York, a few circuits and districts have applied the reasoning of the Supreme
Court. See Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating that the "'Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.'") (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188); Zych v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (carefully noting
that the federal government can encourage cooperation not compel it), aff'd, 19 F.3d 1136
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994); Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. State, 834 F. Supp.
1341, 1347 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (holding, in part, that the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act was unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because it "compelled" states to act),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3477 (Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1030). But see Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v.
South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
Recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aftid, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993), was unconstitutional).
82 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
83 The NRA has shifted from its constitutional stronghold, the Second Amendment, to
a new tactic, the Tenth Amendment. See Tom Teepen, NRA Shooting Nothing but Blanks
ith Second Amendment Argument, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12, 1994, at 7A; Pierre
Thomas, The Brady Law: Sheriffs hallenging Federal Authority, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
1994, at Al. A seventh case is currently pending in the United States District Court for
Wyoming and the presiding judge has announced he will render a decision by the end of the
year. Ruling on Gun Background Oecks Vowed, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Aug. 28, 1995,
at 18A.
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addresses the same basic issues: (1) Did the sheriff have standing to sue?; 84 (2)
How do the provisions of the Brady Act apply to Chief Law Enforcement
Officers?; (3) Were the provisions of the background check violative of the
Tenth Amendment?; and (4) If so, was the section severable from the rest of
the Brady Act? Five of the six district courts hearing the challenges determined
that the Brady Act was unconstitutional85 while one found the rule passed
constitutional scrutiny.86 Due to the intense emotions and strong convictions
that seem to embroil the gun control debate, the stage seems to be set for an
intense battle among the circuit courts87 with a possible trip to the Supreme
84 Although a complete discussion of standing is beyond the scope of this Note, the
Supreme Court further clarified the concept of standing by requiring that the plaintiff
demonstrate to the court that he or she has suffered, or is in imminent danger of suffering, a
distinct and palpable personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct and the injury can most likely be redressed through the judicial system. See Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992).
In the recent challenges to the Brady Act, the interpretation of the first element of
standing, injury in fact, varies under each of the six cases to a certain extent; however, in
each case, the district court did find the requisite injury in fact. Romero v. United States,
883 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (W.D. La. 1995); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030,
1035-36 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Ariz. 1994);
McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States,
852 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503,
1507 (D. Mont. 1994).
The second element of standing, causation, also received varying interpretations;
however, each district court also found the necessary link between the Brady Act and the
injury. Romero, 883 F. Supp. at 1081; Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1039; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at
1377; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 325; Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1380; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at
1507. As for the third element, redressability, each court found sufficient redressability
available in the judicial system. Romero, 883 F. Supp. at 1081; Frank, 860 F. Supp. at
1040; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1377; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 321 (making no specific
reference to redressability); Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1380; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1507.
In addition to the standing requirements, the party must have the capacity to sue. The
ability of the parties to bring a Tenth Amendment challenge is derived from Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17 which requires that the sheriffs must be a real party in interest and have
the capacity to sue or be sued. Once again, each district court found the requisite capacity to
carry forth the suit. Romero, 883 F. Supp. at 1078; Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1034-35; Mack,
856 F. Supp. at 1378; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 325; Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1380-81; Printz,
854 F. Supp. at 1508-09.
85 See Romero, 883 F. Supp. at 1089; Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044; Mack, 856 F.
Supp. at 1383-84; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 327-28; Printz, 854 F. Supp. 1519-20.
86 Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1389.
87 As of the publication of this Note, the battle in the circuits has begun. Each of
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the district court opinions have been appealed to their respective circuit courts. Mack
v. United States, 1995 WL 527616 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1995); Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Brady Law is Upheld in 1st Appeal, Gun-Control Measure Ruled Constitutional, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 9, 1995, at 6 (stating that the Fifth and Second Circuits have appeals
pending before them).
In the Fifth Circuit, the government filed appeals in McGee, Koog, and Romero.
Appeals Court Hears Brady Law Advocates' Arguments, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June
8, 1995, at 28A (acknowledging that Koog and McGee decisions were consolidated
and the Romero case was appealed seperately). McGee and Koog were consolidated on
appeal, and the court heard arguments on June 7, 1995 and announced it would render
a decision before the end of the year. Id. Arguments have not been heard in the
Romero case as of the publication of this Note. The federal government has also filed
an appeal in the Second Circuit challenging the district court's holding in Frank.
Greenburg, supra, at 6.
In the Ninth Circuit, arguments were heard for the appeal of Mack and Printz on
July 11, 1995. The court returned a decision on September 8, 1995 holding that the
Brady Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment. The court held that "[tihe
obligation imposed on state officers by the Brady Act is no more remarkable
than.., the federally imposed duty to report missing children.., or traffic
fatalities .... " Mack v. United States, 1995 WL 527616 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1995).
Furthermore, the court refused to read New York v. United States broadly and
distinguished the focus of New York as stating "the federal government is not entitled
to coerce the states into legislating or regulating according to the dictates of the
federal government." Id. at *2. The court held that "[t]he Brady Act is not the kind of
federal mandate condemned by New York. Id. at *5. Instead, the Brady Act was
characterized as a regulatory program aimed at individuals, not states, and while the
CLEOs must make reasonable efforts to carry out the federal program, they are not
being conscripted into a central sovereign process. Id. The court was unpersuaded by
the argument that the Brady Act interferes with the state duties of the sheriffs, and
rather, the court held "Mack and Printz have not demonstrated that the Act will
interfere unduly with their duties." Id. Thus, the computer checks, required
paperwork and other requirements of the Brady Act did not create enough of a burden
for the Ninth Circuit to find the kind of interference with state functions that would
raise Tenth Amendment concerns. Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held the Brady Act
to be constitutional.
However, the Ninth Circuit's decision was not unanimous. The dissent
characterized the Brady Act as "a step toward concentrating power in the hands of the
federal government, for it treats state officials and workers as if they were mere
federal employees. It makes every CLEO's office an office of the federal bureacracy
funded by the states, but directed from Washington." Id. at *9 (Fernandez, J.
dissenting). Thus, the validity of the Brady Act continues to be suspect under the
Tenth Amendment. Although the majority held the Brady Act constitutional, the
court's charaterization of the Brady Act's interference with the sheriffs' state duties
misconstrues the potential impact of the federal legislation. As this Note will explain,
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Court in the future.88
Although the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence remains
unclear, the provisions of the Brady Act do appear suspect under the Court's
views expressed in New York v. United States.89 While it is clear that handgun
sales affect interstate commerce and thus are subject to congressional
regulation, 90 the permissible reach of the regulation over firearms is subject to
certain restraints and limitations. As a result, the crucial question in the
congressional regulation of handgun purchases is whether the Tenth
Amendment limits the methods which Congress may use to regulate these
purchases. 91
A. How the Brady Act Affects CLEOs
Under § 922(s)(2) of the Brady Act, the CLEO shall make a reasonable
effort to determine whether the handgun purchase would violate the law.92 In
the recent challenges to the Brady Act, the federal government consistently
argued that the provision was entirely discretionary, and that the CLEO was
the Brady Act imposes obligations which do interfere with the state functions of
sheriffs, and as a result, the Brady Act raises serious Tenth Amendment concerns.
88 Julian Eule, professor and associate Dean at the UCLA Law School, believes
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez [v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)] provides strong evidence
that there is a majority on the Court that is going to take very seriously the
demarcation between federal and state power.... The Brady Act and the assault
weapons ban are likely to provide opportunities to see more clearly where the
Court wants that line to be drawn.
Michael Rezendes, Reading Their "Rights" Gun Lobby Challenging 2d Amendment's
Interpretation, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1995, at Al.
89 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
9 0 See Huddelston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974) (holding that exchanges
of firearms with pawnshops are covered under the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968);
United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Congress has the
power to enact the Gun Free School Zones Act), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995); United
States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that it was reasonable for
Congress to conclude that possession of firearms affects the national economy and is within
the regulatory scope of Congress).
91 See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1506.
92 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). See supra text
accompanying note 22.
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not obligated to conduct the background checks. 93 Obviously, the federal
government was attempting to avoid the serious problems that could arise
under the Tenth Amendment due to the direct command of the Brady Act's
language. 94 Although the government presented a plausible argument in favor
of reading the legislation as discretionary, its interpretation fails in light of the
legislative intent as revealed in the committee reports. 95 Ideally, "as long as the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there is generally no need for the
court to inquire beyond the plain meaning of the statute." 96 Unfortunately,
while the language of the Brady Act does permit some understanding of
congressional intentions, it falls far short of evincing a plain meaning. As a
result, the meaning of the statute must be evaluated through the process of
statutory interpretation. 97
1. The Mandatory Language of the Brady Act
When Congress drafted the Brady Act, it specifically used the word
"shall," as opposed to "may," in its efforts to direct the CLEOs to conduct the
background checks. 98 Congress' use of the word "shall" confirms the
interpretation that the CLEO is expected to complete background checks, and it
clearly does not indicate that CLEOs have been granted any discretionary
93 See Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (W.D. La. 1995); Frank v.
States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1039 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372,
1380 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D. Miss. 1994);
Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at
1511.
94 The government appears to have relied upon the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearm's Open Letter to State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to support its belief
that the Brady Act may require no effort at all in the background checks. See supra text
accompanying note 21.
95 See Pfintz, 854 F. Supp. at 1511 (citing DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). "Although [a] court must
generally construe the [Brady] Act to avoid serious constitutional problems, it may not do so
where such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." P'ntz, 854 F.
Supp. at 511.
96 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
97 See 2A NORMAN I. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02
(5th ed. 1992). A majority of courts rely upon the legislative intentions as expressed through
committee reports and other congressional records in order to interpret statutes, for these
documents tend to be highly persuasive and enlightening in the policy and legislative
scheme behind a statute. Id. at § 45.05-.06.
98 See supra text accompanying note 22.
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power in their efforts to comply. 99
More importantly, the House Judiciary Committee Report repeatedly
makes references to the mandatory nature of the background checks
implemented by the Brady Act.1° In three separate sections of the report, the
committee explicitly referred to the "required" nature of the background
checks.10 1 The Judiciary Committee expressed that the provisions of the
background check are an affirmative duty expected of the CLEOs, and the
committee gave no indication that the Act was of a discretionary nature;
instead, through the use of the mandatory language, it reinforced the
interpretation that the Brady Act expects some degree of required effort on the
part of local officials. Unmistakably, Congress intended the CLEO to comply
with the requirements of the Brady Act. The legislation was enacted to act as a
national solution to the escalating gun violence occurring in the United
States, 102 and without total compliance,' 0 3 the remedial effects of the
legislation would fail.
Additionally, the House of Representatives' rejection of an amendment
99 The definition of "shall" is "to indicate.. . command." WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY
635 (1992).
100 H.R. RnP. No. 344, supra note 1, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1984.
101 In the "Summary and Purpose" section of the committee report, the Judiciary
Committee stated that "[lI]ocal law enforcement officials are required to use the waiting
period to determine whether a prospective handgun purchaser has a felony conviction or is
otherwise prohibited by law from buying a gun." H.R. REP. No. 344, supra note 1, at 7,
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1984 (emphasis added). Additionally, under the section
entitled "Brief Explanation of H.R. 1025" (Brady Act prior to its passage), the Judiciary
Committee reinforced the mandatory nature of the Brady Act.
The bill requires local law enforcement officials to make a reasonable effort to ascertain
whether the prospective purchaser is forbidden from buying the handgun. This
background check must be conducted within five business days from the date on which
the prospective purchaser first indicated his or her intention to purchase the handgun.
H.R. REP. No. 344, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1987
(emphasis added). Finally, the Judiciary Committee, in the section entitled "Section-by-
Section Analysis," fiirther explained that "[t]he new subsection would require a chief law
enforcement officer who receives notice pursuant to this bill of a proposed handgun transfer
to make a reasonable effort to ascertain within five business days, using available criminal
history records, whether there is any legal impediment to the transfer." H.R. REP. No. 344,
supra note 1, at 17, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1994 (emphasis added).
102 See supra text accompanying note 1.
103 I certain circumstances, the waiting period and background check have been
excused. See supra note 18. Although Congress recognized particular circumstances in
which a background check would not be necessary, it limited the possible exemptions.
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replacing "shall" with "may" 104 corroborates this apparent intention and
weighs heavily against any flexible interpretation granting CLEOs discretion in
implementing the Brady Act's provisions. During the final days of the
formation of the Brady Act, Congressman Steve Schiff specifically proposed an
amendment to change the language under § 922(s)(2) of the Brady Act. 105
Congressman Schiff "proposed to make the performance of the background
check an option, rather than a requirement, for state and local law enforcement
agencies.... [The] amendment would [have struck] the ['shall'] and insert[ed]
'may,' thus making it an option for state and local agencies . -.o6 By
rejecting the amendment, the House of Representatives reinforced its
commitment to the mandatory nature of the act.
Another important aspect of the background check provision lies within its
language: "[Including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping
systems are available and a national system designated by the Attorney
General." 10 7 The language implies that the reasonable effort of the background
check will require a minimwn amount of research into whatever recordkeeping
system is available to the CLEO. Through its use of the word "including,"
Congress has placed a minimum threshold below which the CLEO cannot go
without violating the purpose of the Brady Act. This CLEO must undertake
some reasonable efforts of research, thereby requiring the expenditure of the
CLEO's limited time and precious resources.
The Brady Act imposes two additional duties onto the CLEOs when
conducting the mandatory background checks.' 0 8 Two separate provisions
command the CLEO to act. First, the CLEO must destroy the paperwork
generated during the background search if the applicant is deemed eligible, 10 9
and second, if the applicant is determined to be ineligible to receive a handgun,
the CLEO must provide the reason for the denial upon proper request.110
104 139 CONG. REc. H9143-44 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993). The House rejected the
Schiff motion to recommit the bill to the Judiciary Committee so that the bill could be
rewritten to include either of two proposed amendments: (1) an elimination of the required
background check, thereby making it an option for state and local officials, or (2) an
assurance that the costs of the background checks would be fully funded by the federal
government. Id.
105 H.R. REP. No. 344, supra note 1, at 39 (additional dissenting view by
Congressman Schiff), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2009.
106 Id.
107 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
108 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
109 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B)Ci) (Supp. V 1993).
110 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C) (Supp. V 1993). Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7)
insulates the CLEO from an action at law for civil damages, 18 U.S.C. § 925A provides an
equitable remedy for erroneous denial of a firearm, whereby the injured individual, after
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Under both provisions, the CLEO must fulfill the required duties, and in the
recent controversies, the government has conceded that both the destruction of
records provision and the explanation of reasons provision are mandatory,
provided a background check is instituted.111 Therefore, these provisions,
coupled with the mandatory background check, require the CLEO to perform
three separate mandatory tasks.
2. Penalty Provisions
Another concern rests in the applicability of the penalty provisions of the
Brady Act to the CLEOs performing the background checks. Although the
Brady Act explicitly exempts CLEOs from liability for civil damages, 112 the
applicability of the criminal provision 113 of the Brady Act does not appear to
exempt the CLEOs from criminal prosecution.1 14 The construction of the
criminal penalty provision clearly indicates its application to "whoever"
exhausting the available administrative avenues, could seek rectification of the error through
an action against the appropriate government agency.
I11 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (D. Mont. 1994).
112 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
A chief law enforcement officer or other person responsible for providing criminal
history background information pursuant to this subsection shall not be liable in an
action at law for damages-A) for the failure to prevent the sale or transfer of a
handgun to a person whose receipt or possession of the handgun is unlawful under this
section; or B) for preventing such a sale or transfer to a person who may lawfully
receive or possess a handgun.
Id.
113 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993). See supra text accompanying note 27.
114 The district courts have split on whether or not the CLEOs are subject to the
criminal penalties. Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (W.D. La. 1995)
(concluding Sheriff Romero has not presented the court with any evidence to suggest the
U.S. Attorney intends to pursue criminal action against a CLEO not conducting background
checks); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Vt. 1994) (relying upon
Memorandum for Janet Reno, Attorney General, from Walter Dellinger, Office of Legal
Counsel, March 16, 1994, the court held the sheriff is not subject to the criminal penalties);
Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Ariz. 1994) ("Under the plain
meaning of the statute, Mack is under threat of criminal penalties .... ."); McGee v. United
States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (relying upon government's interpretation
of the provision, the sheriff is not subject to criminal prosecution); Koog v. United States,
852 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (concluding that the provisions do not apply to
the sheriffs); PrIntz, 854 F. Supp. at 1510 (concluding that the criminal penalty provision
does not apply to CLEOs).
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violates the Brady Act."15 Deciphering the congressional intent behind the
provision requires both an examination of the legislative history, as well as an
analysis of the federal government's interpretation. The legislative history of
the Brady Act shows that it underwent numerous amendments and drafts before
the full Congress approved it.116
When Congress settled upon the five day waiting period and required
reasonable effort on the part of the CLEOs, the legislative history did not
evince any indication of whether the criminal provision would apply to
CLEOs. 117 While the silence may lend support to the conclusion that Congress
had no intent to apply the penalty provisions to the CLEOs, it is quite possible
to consider the inaction by Congress as reinforcing the interpretation that the
provision was intended to subject uncooperative CLEOs to criminal penalties.
Additionally, the Brady Act's specific exemption of CLEOs from civil
damages resulting from the improper execution of the background check
procedures 18 does not imply Congress expected to relieve the CLEOs of
criminal responsibility. The two provisions are quite different, with the civil
damages provision insulating the CLEO from suits in defamation, negligence,
and other civil injuries when they conduct the mandatory background checks,
whereas the criminal provision appears to unequivocally enforce compliance
with the implementation of the Brady Act itself. Since these two provisions
obviously are enacted with two separate purposes, an argument that the
exemption expressed in one section necessarily implies an exemption in another
is entirely incongruous with the purposes of the legislation. Without a criminal
provision in place to coerce the CLEOs to conduct the background checks, the
Brady Act becomes a statute with a lot of bark, but little bite, for the CLEOs
can neglect their responsibilities under the statute without fear of reprisal from
the federal government.
While many of the district courts faced with the recent Brady Act
challenges have followed the policy of construing an ambiguous statute in such
a manner to avoid constitutional problems unless the construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress,' 1 9 the intent in the criminal provision of the
115 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993). See supra note 27.
116 An earlier version of the Brady Act, which was passed in the House of
Representatives but never enacted, included the criminal penalty provision; however, it did
not require the CLEOs to conduct a reasonable effort in the background check. 137 CoNG.
REcH11,692 (1991).
117 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1993).
118 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
119 See Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. La. 1995); Frank v.
United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D.Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372
(D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v.
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Brady Act is far from ambiguous.1 20 While the rule of leniency requires that a
penal statute be construed strictly against the government,' 2 ' the meaning of
the term "whoever" within the penalty provision is quite clear and should not
be misapplied so that the CLEOs are exempt from its expectations.122
Therefore, exempting the CLEOs from the penalty statute flouts the plain
meaning of the language. 123
The second source of consideration lies within the federal government's
interpretation of the statute. The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel, Walter Dellinger, stated "[i]t would be difficult to prosecute a
CLEO for failing to make 'a reasonable effort,' and such a prosecution would
be subject to a Fifth Amendment due process challenge." 124 Although the
Justice Department has interpreted the statute so that criminal prosecution
would present difficult challenges, an agency's interpretation is entitled to
deference only when the statute is ambiguous on the matter at issue.25 As
previously developed, the Brady Act's usage of the term "whoever" does lend
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp.
1503 (D. Mont. 1994); see also DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
120 In footnote 5 of its opinion, the Mack court summed up the issue of ambiguity quite
well.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the term ["whoever"] lacks clarity, several
interlocking principles guide ... [the] construction to the identical result. First, a statute
must be construed, if fairly possible, to avoid constitutional problems. If ambiguous, the
more lenient construction in favor of a criminal defendant is required. It is only if the
language is unclear that the Court need refer to legislative history as an aid to statutory
interpretation.
Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1377 n.5 (citations omitted).
121 See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 (1992);
Bussic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
348 (1972).
122 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
123 "[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there is generally no
need for court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
124 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (March 16, 1994).
125 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Under Chevron, it is "unclear whether an agency's
interpretation of a criminal statute is entitled to deference." United States v. Douglas, 974
F.2d 1046, 1048 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992).
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itself to a plain meaning, and since courts are the final authorities on issues of
statutory construction, 126 the courts should not be obligated to heed to the
interpretations of the Justice Department. 127 The Justice Department's present
refusal to proceed with the possible criminal prosecutions of CLEOs does not
preempt the department from reversing its stance and pursuing criminal charges
against violating CLEOs in the future. Regardless of the Department's stance,
the law remains unaltered on the books. Therefore, while the Justice
Department's interpretation may be persuasive, it is not controlling.
Through the penalty provision and the three mandated tasks required of
CLEOs, the Brady Act clearly mandates action on the part of local and state
officials. Within the structure of the Brady Act, they are given no opportunity
to avoid the implications of the Act, and therefore, it is suspect under the
Supreme Court's recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in New York v.
United States.128
B. Do the Background Check Provisions Violate the Tenth Amendment?
In New York, the Court determined that Congress did have the power to
offer the states a legitimate choice rather than issuing an unavoidable
command, 129 for "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the states to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program." 130 Instead, through cooperative
federalism, 131 Congress could work with the state governments in a
noncompulsory fashion in order to achieve a mutual goal. However, if
Congress did not want the possibility of incomplete enactment of its legislation,
it could preempt state power and undertake the regulation without the
involvement of the state.132 "The Constitution... gives Congress the
authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state
regulation." 133 Therefore, if Congress believes it is essential that it regulate a
126 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987).
127 Although, since the Justice Department did not raise this issue in the present
actions, it would be estopped from doing so on appeal. McGee v. United States, 863 F.
Supp. 321, 324 n.3 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
128 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
12 9 Id. at 184-85. The Court has recognized the validity of cooperative federalism
rather than compelled compliance. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
130 New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
131 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289.
132 New York, 505 U.S. at 177-79.
133 Id. at 178. Congress exercised this power to some extent through the exemption of
states with their own programs for background checks of handgun purchasers, provided that
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particular area, it may directly do so without infringing upon the powers
reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment.
When Congress imposes direct and uncompromising legislation onto the
states, questions arise regarding the methods Congress uses to achieve a
particular end. "'[The Supreme] Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal
command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations.'" 134
Although, as previously discussed, Congress can implement persuasive and
preemptory legislation 135 without violating the Tenth Amendment, legislation
which requires mandatory compliance without any possible alternatives violates
the principles of state sovereignty. 136
As a result of the mandatory nature of the Brady Act in regards to the
CLEOs' duties, the Act is quite similar to the "take title" provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act scrutinized in New York.' 37 Due to
the mandatory nature of the Brady Act, Congress has conscripted state and
local officials into implementing federal legislation developed to achieve the
federal government's desired end.138 In New York, the federal government
required state legislatures to regulate in a particular area, yet under the Brady
Act, the federal government has bypassed the state legislature and has directly
commanded the CLEOs to directly fulfill the federal objectives. The Brady Act
moves beyond simply requiring action by the state legislature, as expressed in
the unconstitutional "take title" provision of New York, and actually impresses
the local officials into service, thereby dismissing any possibility of the Brady
Act acting as a law of general applicability among both states and private
the programs comply with the timetables of the Attorney General. If the program does not
comply with the requirements, the state's program will be pre-empted by the federal plan.
H.R. REP. No. 344, supra note 1, at 10-11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1987.
134 New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62
(1982)).
135 See supra text accompanying note 72.
136 See supra text accompanying note 73.
137 Id.
138 In FERC, the Court held that the Mississippi Public Service Commission could be
compelled to adjudicate disputes arising under a federal statute because the Commission was
part of the state adjudicatory body, but did not require the states to adopt a legislative
program. 456 U.S. at 768-71. Under the Court's holding in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
394 (1947), which stated that the federal government can direct the state governments to do
the type of activity in which the state governments ordinarily engage, supports FERC's
holding because adjudicatory procedures are ordinary state functions. Under the Brady Act,
the CLEOs, for the most part (some states may require that the CLEOs conduct background
checks), are being asked to do an activity that they do not do in the course of their normal
activities; therefore, Congress can not expect that the Brady Act simply direct the CLEOs to
fulfill obligations they already have under state and local law as permitted in Testa.
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entities. 139 Congress has stepped beyond forcing state governments to legislate,
and instead, has effectively skipped the middle man and imposed its own
legislation on state and local officials. 140 Without a viable option of discretion
for the CLEOs, "Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement
from coercion." 141
Diminished accountability 142 is another undesired result of the Brady Act,
for "where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both the state and federal officials is diminished." 143 By
placing the responsibility of the background check onto the CLEO, Congress
has effectively insulated itself from the unpopular decisions by forcing the
CLEO to act as the front line administrator of the Brady Act. 44 While some
CLEOs are appointed to their positions and thus partially insulated from the
repercussions of the unpopularity of the decisions, a vast number are directly
elected, and therefore, will suffer from voter disapproval which could result in
the loss of their positions even though they are completely unable to avoid their
duties under the Brady Act. 145 Additionally, the Brady Act's minimum
threshold for background checks will demand allocation of the CLEOs'
precious few resources, thus resulting in the possible neglect of the official
duties of the officers. 146 As a result of decreased services resulting from the
impact of the background checks on the fiscal budget of the law enforcement
agency, responsibility for the problems will be blamed upon the CLEO, who
might face losses in the election due to voter perception that the CLEO is
inefficient with the tax revenue. 147 Finally, with the local officials suffering the
brunt of the voter disapproval of the effects of the Brady Act, Congress may
receive praise and acknowledgment for effectively attacking an issue of extreme
importance; however, it will avoid the consequences of the undesirable costs
and impacts on the citizens. 148
In sum, the actions required under the Brady Act require a CLEO to
139 Unlike the legislation scrutinized in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Fair Labor Standards Act, which was generally
applicable to both state and private entities, the Brady Act targets the state governments
specifically without any regard to private actors.
140 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1042-43 (D. Vt. 1994).
141 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
143 New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
144 See supra text accompanying note 75.
145 Id.
146 See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (D. Mont. 1994).
147 Id.
148 Id.
1995] 1243
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
conduct three mandatory tasks, as well as remain subject to criminal liability
should the Justice Department reverse its opinion on the criminal provisions of
the Act. Under the mandatory structure of the Brady Act, Congress has
"commandeered" the CLEOs to implement federal legislation without
providing them with any other viable options. Additionally, the federal
government has not provided any funding for the background check
procedures, thus forcing the CLEOs and local governments to bear the
financial burden of a program they may not necessarily wish to administer.
Without providing an opportunity to choose not to participate in the federal
legislation, the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment through its intrusion
into powers reserved entirely for the state government. 149
C. Are the Unconstitutional Provisions Severable from the Rest of the
Statute?
The Brady Act presents the American public with a commendable attempt
at regulating handgun purchases. However, no matter how noble the cause of
the legislation, poor draftsmanship which results in a violation of the
Constitution cannot be overlooked. Therefore, when analyzing a statute, a court
must consider whether the unconstitutional provision can be severed from the
statute, permitting the remaining portion to survive.
"The standard for determining the severability of an unconstitutional
provision is well established: Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of
that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully
operative as law." 15 0
Within the Gun Control Act, Congress drafted a severability clause. 151 The
Brady Act was written as an amendment to the Gun Control Act, and as a
result, the severability clause directly applies to the Brady Act. Under the
Supreme Court's holding in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,152 if the statute
contains a severability clause, there is a presumption that Congress did not
149 Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1087 (W.D. La. 1995); Frank v.
United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 856 F.
Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.
Miss. 1994); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1517.
150 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992) (quoting Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
151 18 U.S.C. § 928 (Supp. IV 1965-1968) ("If any provision of [the Gun Control
Act] is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter ... shall not be affected thereby.").
152 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
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intend the validity of the entire statute to be dependent upon the
constitutionality of the suspect provision. 153 Analysis of the Brady Act in its
entirety indicates that while the background check was an important provision,
it was not the sole purpose of the Act. Rather, the Brady Act without the
background check will continue to require the five day waiting period, 154 the
requirement that sellers transmit certain information to the proper
authorities, 155 the future implementation of the national instant background
check system, 156 and the option of the CLEOs to conduct a background
check. 157 Although the background check will be at the option of the CLEOs,
the balance of the Brady Act remains fully operational, and therefore, severing
the mandatory language out of the statute will not render the remainder of the
statute dysfunctional.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent challenges to the Brady Act highlight the debate about unfunded
federal mandates. The lessons of the district court decisions should serve to
remind Congress that the states and their citizens will not remain silent in the
wake of legislation with which they do not agree nor wish to pay for. As
developed within this Note, the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is anything
but clear; however, the recent decision in New York v. United States represents
the Court's latest word on the Amendment. Through the decision, the Court
communicated to the lower courts that federal intrusion into state sovereignty is
subject to a limitation. The lower courts have been instructed to look at the
questionable legislation and determine the methodology used by the federal
government in achieving its ends. If the legislative mechanism does not allow
the state and local governments to exercise their discretion regarding whether
or not to comply with the legislation, it is constitutionally suspect and should
be examined carefully. The Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
while understandably confusing to apply, does not simply represent a
continuum on which the lower courts are supposed to fit in the controversy
before them. 158 Rather, the Court has established complex guidelines with
153 Id. at 686.
154 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)() (Supp. V 1993).
155 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)l-(IV) (Supp. V 1993).
156 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
157 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993). While the mandatory nature of the Brady
Act interferes with the sovereignty of states protected under the Tenth Amendment, most
CLEOs will find it in their best interest to conduct the background check, thus fulfilling the
original intentions of the Brady Act.
158 Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (W.D. Tex. 1994). The court did
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which the lower court should examine the legislation and determine its
constitutionality. The Brady Act's mandatory provisions exceed the powers
granted to Congress and invade state sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment. Therefore, the decisions of the district courts holding the Brady
Act unconstitutional should be affirmed.
not accept a broad reading of the New York decision, and it held that the duties the federal
government imposed upon the law enforcement officers were minimal duties similar to
those permitted in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). However, the court failed to
understand the difference between the Brady Act and the legislation under scrutiny in
FERC. The utility regulatory commission in FERC was afforded the option to decline to
follow the federal legislation provided they at least consider it. On the contrary, the Brady
Act provides no options or discretion and instead mandates the CLEOs to follow its
directives or become subject to penalties. As a result, the court's decision that the Brady
Act's background check requirements were constitutional seriously misconstrues the
Supreme Court's present interpretation of the Tenth Amendment.
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